Articles
Israeli attitudes towards Palestinian nonviolent struggle – A
preliminary Report prepared for participants in MEND's
workshops by the Truman Institute (Edy Kaufman and Yana
Neumann)
Dear friends:
Let us start by expressing our appreciation and support for the
work done by MEND (Middle East Nonviolence and
Democracy) and yourself in furthering nonviolent action. We
know it is an uphill battle but are confident that a sustained,
united and creative strategy can affect change and
eventually lead to a just peace. A preliminary generalization is
in order, as psychology teaches us, a crisis situation blurs the
vision of people involved; our vision impaired, we become
more shortsighted, and the misperception of reality makes it
difficult to read the true adversary intention. Violent conflict
brings us to be more prown to believe in “bad news” than to
recognize” good news”. Hence change of perception into
peace and coexistence requires harder work for both Israelis
and Palestinians
A. The Impact of the First Intifada on the Israeli society
Firstly we need to understand the context that shaped the
Israeli perceptions of Palestinian nonviolence in the late 1980’s.
a) The Palestinian struggle was moving away from acts of
extreme violence perpetuated mostly in Israel’s territory
(armed attacks to buses, schools) by PLO commandos from
outside the Occupied Territories. These acts were conceived
as a main element in the armed struggle.
b) More than 90% of the Unified National Leadership of the
Intifada commands were calling for nonviolent acts ( parallel
social and economic institutions, business strike closing down
shops at mid-day, no service in Israel’s police force, not paying
taxes, boycott of Israeli products, hunger strikes, peaceful
demonstrations, display of Palestinian flag, etc.)
c) For Israelis, there was a relative small loss of life. Less than
one hundred Jewish casualties during the entire period 1987-
1991, overwhelmingly in the West Bank and not within Israel’s
pre-1967 border
d) Although there was no awareness of any particular
training in nonviolence, the grassroot mobilization, including
women and children, gave the impression of a stpontaneous
movement of peaceful resistence and civil disobedience,
fighting occupation with means that were bounded in the Arab
and Muslim tradition
e) The Palestinian rebellion was a mass participatory non-
armed movement and not conducted by small armed groups.
f) The Palestinian struggle under occupation was able to
influence PLO in Diaspora leading to the 19th PNC resolution of
1988, recognizing the idea of a Palestinian state side by side to
Israel.
Salim Tamari summarizes the achievements of the Intifada
after thirty months:
“Its main achievement seems to lie behind: a spectacular
abilty to mobilize whole sectors of a civilian populationm
through networks of underground civilian resistence and
communal self-help projects, challenging Israel’s ability to
continue ruling the West-Bank and Gaza. The pattern of daily
street confrontation has dealt a moral, if not logistic, blow to
the might of the Israeli army. Above all, the Intifada placed
relations with the Palestinians and the future of the occupied
territories at the top of the agenda of all Israeli Political
parties”. We concur with this assessment.
When assessing its impact, it may be hard to isolate the
dimension of the first Intifada in the change in Israel (other
concurrent factors were the demise of the Soviet Union, the
threats of the Gulf War, the decision of Kin Hussein to relinquish
his control over the West Bank- in itself influenced by the
Intifada). Overall, the positive impact on Israeli society and
regime, influenced changing the government in 1992, Rabin’s
change of hearts from “breaking the bones” moved towards
the acceptance of negotiating with the PLO, The moving from
Summud (Steadfastiness ) to Intifada was seen as an
empowerment of grass roots Palestinian fighting for their rights.
Rabin's acknowledgment of awareness of the legal and moral
constraints posed by the Israeli Supreme Court and the human
rights organization B'tselem in the use of repressive means
against civilians, was at that time, a recognition of the
limitations of a system with a self-image of adherence to
democracy and the rule of law. Consequently, he and Israelis
started moving away from the old Jordanian-option to the
support of peace with an independent Palestinian state.
However, there was an element of violent struggle in the
Intifada that jeopardized the long-term and overall positive
impact. The category “popular violence”, “limited violence”
non-lethal power”, “unarmed violence”, “non-violent
violence”, “children of the stones” (all terms used by
Palestinian media and leadership) did not maximize the effect
of a nonviolent struggle. Stone throwing by children mostly
against soldiers and settlers was perceived as young adults
endangering Israeli civilians by throwing rocks. While the
Palestinian message may have been intimidation and
defiance, the Israelis sensed a live threatening situation.
Sporadic cases of petrol bombs/cocktail Molotovs (Israeli bus
in Jericho) resulting in occasional deaths also affected in 1989
the electoral behavior tilting the balance to a slight majority in
favor in of Likud. The element of fear is personal and subjective
and while Israelis could be causing enormous damage and
suffering to the Palestinians, it still did not compensate for the
sense of insecurity, which may have been accentuated by
previous historical experiences, including the recent trauma of
the Holocaust. All in all, the presence of a “limited violence”
did not allow to fully capitalize profit, and escalated into a loss
of unity and hundreds of lives by the Palestinian themselves
(what was called “Intra-fada”).
In the first Intifada we find a major shift and a significant
willingness to compromise in the final objectives (moving away
from the "liberation of Palestine", a "secular-democratic
Palestine" to acceptance of Israel through "the two-state
solution"). But when it comes to the means of achieving such
realistic and pragmatic objective, the shift is not all the way
from violent to nonviolent action. The concept "limited
violence" remained in Israeli perceptions as closer to
"violence" than “non-violence". Yet, in retrospect, we still could
find within the Israeli society a growing understanding of the
Palestinians as fighting for a right cause, Palestinians no longer
fearing the Israelis, determined to seek self-determination in
their own state (side-by-side with Israel), and potential partners
for a lasting peace.
What would have been the impact of a Palestinian leadership
and people’s nonviolent struggle? Evidence of its
effectiveness has been clear in other cases such as Gandhi’s
India, the Solidarity workers’ movement in Poland, the “Velvet”
revolution in Czechoslovakia, etc. While hard to predict at
that time, if the described context and “limited violence”
produced such positive outcomes, our expectation was that a
long-term nonviolent struggle had the potential of an Israeli
agreement to end occupation and the establishment of a
Palestinian state in better terms that the Oslo processes.
b) Public opinion
Sporadic polls of Israeli public opinion have focus on the issue
of Palestinian nonviolence/violent struggle. A poll conducted
by Edy and the Luis Guttman Israel institute of applied Social
Research – in December 1990 showed that:
62% perceived Palestinian violence as unlimited
74%-78% categorized throwing stones at civilians and/or
soldiers as unlimited violence.
The most frequent recommendation made to the Palestinians
(43%) was not to use any extent of force in order to achieve
the wanted results.
An absolute majority (80%) believed that the methods
employed by the Palestinians in order to establish a state are
mainly violent methods.
Half of those questioned (51%) agreed that the Palestinians
would probably or certainly not achieve a state without the
use of force.
These results show that while the level of violence used by
Palestinians was limited, it was not perceived as such by Israelis.
c) Media
During the first Intifada Edy's research followed Media
coverage of the Intifada in two major Israeli news papers
"Yediot Ahronot" and "Haaretz". Reports of violence and
nonviolence acts were monitored over 1988-1990.
Before turning to the results a general remark on media is in
order. The media is generally known to report more saliently on
the exceptional rather than the normal. It may therefore not be
surprising that the violent aspect of the Intifada was reflected
and stressed more, at least in the beginning.
The main findings were as follows: Percentages of non violence
actions reported in Yediot Ahronot went down from 50.6%
(1988) to 34.9% (1989) and 32.2% (1990). In Ha'aretz the reports
went down from 48% (1988) to 34.9% (1989) and 30.7% (1990).
The report on violent activities went up in "Haaretz" and down
in "Yediot Ahronot", possibly reflecting the routinization of
events wide circulating news. The results clearly show that the
majority of events reported were violent events 60.1% verses
39.9% non violent (the subdivision and counting of violent and
non violent events took into account different perceptions of
what is and isn't violent by categorizing according to actual
violence performed ie. Demonstration with violence =violent,
demonstration = non violent).
B. The Impact of the second Intifada on Israeli Society
a) Public Opinion Polls
In depth research on the topic of Israeli public opinion on non
violence actions, during the second Intifada, has yet to be
conducted. The only public opinion poll on Israelis reaction to
non violent actions by Palestinians was performed by "search
for common grounds" in August 2002. The data presented is
therefore based on public opinion polls dealing with related
topics, such as: a. attitudes towards Israeli non violent act
regarding the disengagement plan national security ex. This
report can only give a partial picture as to the attitudes in the
Israeli public. A more detailed report will be available once
the Truman institute conducts a poll on the topic towards the
end of 2005.
a. During 2002 Search for common grounds commissioned a
poll to determine attitudes of the Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli
publics on the potential for nonviolent methods in the
Palestinian Intifada. A Palestinian polling organization, the
Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC), carried
out the poll of 600 Palestinians through face-to-face
interviews. An Israeli polling organization, the B.L. and Lucille
Cohen Institute for Public Opinion Research of Tel Aviv
University, carried out the poll of 504 Israeli Jews by telephone
interviews. The key findings regarding Israeli public opinion are
as follows:
• 78% of Israelis questioned believe that the Palestinians
have a legitimate right to seek a Palestinian state provided
that they use non violent means.
• If the Palestinians were to move from violent to non
violent form of protest, A majority of Jew would favor making
concessions to the Palestinians, including fading out the
checkpoints between Palestinian towns (61%) and being more
flexible in negotiations about the future Palestinian state (60%).
With the disengagement plan holding a central place in Israeli
society discussions these days, a relevant question is the
change in attitudes towards the disengagement program
which could be promoted by non violent actions. This is
assuming that part of the negative attitudes stem from fear
from possible Palestinian violence following army retreat.
The wide spread support for the disengagement plan and these
results suggest that non violent action could promote the
advancement in negotiations.
b. The peace index is a public opinion poll conducted monthly
amongst Israeli public. Through a set questionnaire it tries to
determine the level of support towards peace. In addition to
the usual questions, the September poll dealt also with the
issue of disengagement and attitudes toward different
methods of protest which may be used by Israelis opposing to
the plan. Attitudes towards means of protest, conceived as
legitimate in the Israeli side, could reflect attitudes in general
including towards Palestinians legitimate ways of protest.
The questionnaire distinguished between three possible protest
methods:
Within the law (for example, petitions, legal demonstrations),
non violent civil disobedience (unlicensed demonstrations,
refusal of army service, refusal to pay taxes and so forth), finally
they were asked as to violent civil disobedience (the use of
force against evacuating settlements). The results of the poll
show that, as in the past, there is support for protest as long as
it is legal. 86.3% support legal means of protest while only 13.5%
support illegal methods, such as non violent civil disobedience,
and an even smaller number 6.5% support violent protest. In
another series of questions the initiators of the poll tried to find
the levels of support for negotiations and whether support was
conditional or not on the end of terror. 50.3% agreed with the
opinion that negotiations should not be renewed as long as
terror persists. 43.1% adopted the opinion that negotiations
should start without any prerequisites. Widespread non violent
activities replacing stereotypical perception of Palestinians as
terrorists could fulfill the preliminary demand of most of the
public and act as a catalyst for renewed negotiations.
c. Research on the reaction to terrorism may not seem
relevant at first glance, but as it is the other end of the scale
compared with non violent action, it could suggest why non
violent action has a high chance of promoting attitude
change in the Israeli public.
A recent research " The Impact of Terrorism on Political
Attitudes: A Two-Edged Sword" , based on 2000 questionnaires,
dealing with the impact of terrorism on Israelis political
attitudes concludes with the following:
Terrorist acts promote fear in Individuals and society in general.
Fearful individuals show the following behaviors:
• Impatience towards ‘others’, and the tendency to ignore
basic civil rights
• A decrease in the efficiency of cognitive processes >
irrational thinking and reliance on stereotypes
• Greater willingness to take risks
• Aggressive and militant reactions
These conclusions suggest that terrorism doesn't not help
change attitudes in the wanted direction (does not enhance
concession and so forth) but pushes individuals to the other
extreme. Although this research deals with the use of an
extreme form of violence and does not deal with non violent
action, it could suggest that affecting the psych of individuals
through non violent actions has a better chance of
succeeding since then individuals are not in the extreme state
of fear which promotes aggression and militant attitudes.
d. The National Security and Public Opinion Project monitors'
Israeli public opinion on issues related to national security.
Certain trends in attitudes of the Israeli public are relevant to
the topic.
The survey presented here "Israel Public opinion on national
security 2003"
was conducted between April 27 and May 23, 2003. Bellow are
the main relevant findings:
49% believe that the Israeli Arab conflict can not be solved by
military means.
34% thought it could and 17% took the middle position. The
parallel numbers for 2002 show a conceptual change that
occurred in the public over the later prior to the second
Intifada. The numbers respectively are 36% , 45% and 19%.
These results suggest that most people may be more attentive
to non violent actions made on both the Palestinian and the
Israeli side as they search for other forms, beside military force,
to bring the conflict to and end.
Important themes rising in the 2003 survey are those of
moderation and conciliation, replacing threats of violence
and appearing in the 2002 survey.
34% estimated the likelihood of war with Arab states as
medium or high compared with 79% in 2002 70% in 2001 39% in
2000.
Estimations of peace also rebounded: 43% thought that peace
with Arab states would be strengthened during the next three
years compared with 21% in 2002, 35% in 2001 and 70% in 2000.
The conclusion of this research is that there has been a change
in attitude in the last few years. Israeli public perceived the
aspirations of the Arabs in a less pessimistic manner than in
2002. This optimism may be an opening for strengthening the
trust of the Israelis in their Palestinian partners, a process which
non violent actions can promote.
Media coverage:
The topic of non violence is poorly reported on in Israeli media,
this may in itself point to lack of awareness in the Israeli public
to what is being done. Besides the major events bellow, there
were only a few reports on demonstrations against the wall. All
the reports on the demonstrations stated the presence of
foreign and Israelis at these demonstrations.
One of the most recent events gaining wide media coverage
in Israeli was the visit of Aron Gandi. Aron Gandi following in his
grandfathers' footsteps is a central figure in the field of non
violent resistance. Gandi was invited by Palestinians who want
to advance the idea of a popular struggle against Israelis. He
met with Palestinian authority chairman Yasser Arafat, met with
the Geneva convention initiators, lectured in the west bank
and other places. His visit was reported on national television
The connection of such a world known figure with the
Palestinian struggle surely raised awareness amongst Israelis to
other forms of action taken by Palestinians and by that may
contribute to enhancing trust toward some of the Palestinian
public.
Most major news papers in Israel (Maariv, Jerusalem Post,
Haaretz) reported the visit. However, a few reporters (mainly in
Haaretz) criticized the awareness of Israeli public to the topic
of non violence.
Quoting Yoel Esteron in Haaretz following Aron Gandis Visit:
There are Palestinians who now believe in Gandis ideas…..They
assembeled in El-Bireh on Thursday and participated in a the
Rally on Friday at Abu Dis Together with Israeli peace activists.
.. In the mean time their voice is not echoing here. The minute
they were given in the news broadcast was swallowed up by
reports of the near lynch of truck drivers at Qalandiyah.
Esteron continues and says that non violent struggle could win
the Palestinian lost affection of the left and practical support
from the very broad Israeli center including a considerable
part of the Likud party.
There were two more non violent events which received wide
coverage: the killing of activist Rachel Corey in March 2003
while she was demonstrating in non violent ways against the
destruction of a house in Rafiach and Gil Naamati, an Israeli
citizen, being shot and seriously wounded by an Israeli soldier.
These two widely reviewed events (in Israel and in the case of
Corey world wide), have two factors in common: (a) they were
both cases of non Palestinians performing non violent acts of
resistance (b) they were both cases in which the Israeli army
retaliated with severe force to the non violent act.
The wide coverage of these two events, while non violent acts
are being performed every day by Palestinians, raises the
question of the necessity for "outsiders" (non Palestinian)
support in order to raise awareness in Israeli public. The second
question is how Palestinians can gain more coverage for the
everyday non violent resistance acts performed by them.
As in the first Intifada, there is more exposure through the
media to violent events rather than non violent acts.
Final remarks & conclusions
Even if we did not study systematically as yet the impact of the
Post-Oslo Intifada Al Aqsa we can observe much more difficult
context that is determining a much more negative Israeli
attitude, based on the perception of a militarized Palestinian
struggle. We want to study the current picture in a systematic
manner and hopefully report back to you and to other
interested Palestinian friends in about a year from now. As we
have done in the short analysis above, we are not planning to
describe the cause and effect sequence and the major
responsibility of the Israelis in the current warlike situation.
Before reaching some conclusions allow us to give you some
realistic appraisal about the context in which the majority of
Israeli perception is being shaped:
a) The failure of Camp David II is showing that there was
that the Palestinians were not a reliable partner for
negotiation, then and even now corruption affecting
credibility of bona fide negotiators.
b) High level and prolonged Palestinian violence as
symbolized by suicide bombers, worse than previous historical
experiences since the 1948 war, including the isolated acts of
terror in the 1970’s and early 1980’s.
c) Most acts of violence have taken place within the pre-
1967 borders (and not against settlements and IDF forces in
the Occupied Territories). The shelling with “Kassam” rockets
may have replaced to a large extent the acts of suicide
bombers, now allegedly reduced because of the Wall (called
by most Israelis the “fence”). Hence, Intifada al Aqsa is different
from the first Intifada that focused on liberating the territories
of West Bank and Gaza not the liberation of all historic
Palestine (including Israel)
d) Most acts of violence against innocent civilians and not
military personnel (before the current Intifada more than 90%
of Israeli casualties were military).
e) The PLO Tunis leadership and Chairman Arafat in
particular are seen as supporting or at least condoning martyr’s
(Shay’id) violent acts.
f) The Palestinians do not believe in nonviolence
g) No peace with Palestinians and regional instability for
more than “100”years (quote). The popular view is that
separation is the “only way”.
As you can see, the overall context for Israeli attitudes is very
negative and does not take into account the Palestinian
suffering and the mistakes of the Israeli leadership.
As some people say: “The right was right”, “no left is left” !!!. And
yet, we are witnessing the disintegration of Likud, the Jewish
settlers are at the defensive facing majority support to
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Are we facing a recovery of
the moderates? Can Palestinians contribute to such process of
change?
The findings in public opinion polls and media show that there is
room for some optimism.
The following are our main conclusions and suggestions:
a) Public opinion polls show that the Israeli public in general is
ready to end the violence and is tending towards conciliation.
Non violent actions reported to the Israeli public, we believe,
will strengthen these positive trends in Israeli society and may
promote further support and activism.
b) The small number of reports on non violent actions and the
wide coverage of figures and activities conducted by non
Palestinian may point to the necessity of connecting with
Israeli and other figures. In his lecture on the subject of non
violence Johan Galtung repeated the importance of the
chain, or connection both within all strata's of the resisting
society and the connection to people in the other society. He
mentioned the chain factor as a main contributor to the
success of Gandhi’s struggle to free India of the British. This
connection between societies and within the Palestinian
society may need strengthening.
c) The low coverage of non violence events in Israeli media
may also suggest that Israeli publics' reaction have been
blunted and an extra ordinary, wide spanning breakthrough
activity is necessary to gain attention (for example the settlers
idea to create a human chain to Jerusalem).
d) Research conducted regarding the first Intifada and the
more recent studies presented here suggest the importance of
clear goal to be presented to Israelis while conducting
nonviolent acts. The interpretation given to acts may not
always be what they were intended to be and therefore could
be perceived as severe violence aimed at destructing the
state of Israel or endangering Israeli's rather than a legitimate
action against occupation.
preliminary Report prepared for participants in MEND's
workshops by the Truman Institute (Edy Kaufman and Yana
Neumann)
Dear friends:
Let us start by expressing our appreciation and support for the
work done by MEND (Middle East Nonviolence and
Democracy) and yourself in furthering nonviolent action. We
know it is an uphill battle but are confident that a sustained,
united and creative strategy can affect change and
eventually lead to a just peace. A preliminary generalization is
in order, as psychology teaches us, a crisis situation blurs the
vision of people involved; our vision impaired, we become
more shortsighted, and the misperception of reality makes it
difficult to read the true adversary intention. Violent conflict
brings us to be more prown to believe in “bad news” than to
recognize” good news”. Hence change of perception into
peace and coexistence requires harder work for both Israelis
and Palestinians
A. The Impact of the First Intifada on the Israeli society
Firstly we need to understand the context that shaped the
Israeli perceptions of Palestinian nonviolence in the late 1980’s.
a) The Palestinian struggle was moving away from acts of
extreme violence perpetuated mostly in Israel’s territory
(armed attacks to buses, schools) by PLO commandos from
outside the Occupied Territories. These acts were conceived
as a main element in the armed struggle.
b) More than 90% of the Unified National Leadership of the
Intifada commands were calling for nonviolent acts ( parallel
social and economic institutions, business strike closing down
shops at mid-day, no service in Israel’s police force, not paying
taxes, boycott of Israeli products, hunger strikes, peaceful
demonstrations, display of Palestinian flag, etc.)
c) For Israelis, there was a relative small loss of life. Less than
one hundred Jewish casualties during the entire period 1987-
1991, overwhelmingly in the West Bank and not within Israel’s
pre-1967 border
d) Although there was no awareness of any particular
training in nonviolence, the grassroot mobilization, including
women and children, gave the impression of a stpontaneous
movement of peaceful resistence and civil disobedience,
fighting occupation with means that were bounded in the Arab
and Muslim tradition
e) The Palestinian rebellion was a mass participatory non-
armed movement and not conducted by small armed groups.
f) The Palestinian struggle under occupation was able to
influence PLO in Diaspora leading to the 19th PNC resolution of
1988, recognizing the idea of a Palestinian state side by side to
Israel.
Salim Tamari summarizes the achievements of the Intifada
after thirty months:
“Its main achievement seems to lie behind: a spectacular
abilty to mobilize whole sectors of a civilian populationm
through networks of underground civilian resistence and
communal self-help projects, challenging Israel’s ability to
continue ruling the West-Bank and Gaza. The pattern of daily
street confrontation has dealt a moral, if not logistic, blow to
the might of the Israeli army. Above all, the Intifada placed
relations with the Palestinians and the future of the occupied
territories at the top of the agenda of all Israeli Political
parties”. We concur with this assessment.
When assessing its impact, it may be hard to isolate the
dimension of the first Intifada in the change in Israel (other
concurrent factors were the demise of the Soviet Union, the
threats of the Gulf War, the decision of Kin Hussein to relinquish
his control over the West Bank- in itself influenced by the
Intifada). Overall, the positive impact on Israeli society and
regime, influenced changing the government in 1992, Rabin’s
change of hearts from “breaking the bones” moved towards
the acceptance of negotiating with the PLO, The moving from
Summud (Steadfastiness ) to Intifada was seen as an
empowerment of grass roots Palestinian fighting for their rights.
Rabin's acknowledgment of awareness of the legal and moral
constraints posed by the Israeli Supreme Court and the human
rights organization B'tselem in the use of repressive means
against civilians, was at that time, a recognition of the
limitations of a system with a self-image of adherence to
democracy and the rule of law. Consequently, he and Israelis
started moving away from the old Jordanian-option to the
support of peace with an independent Palestinian state.
However, there was an element of violent struggle in the
Intifada that jeopardized the long-term and overall positive
impact. The category “popular violence”, “limited violence”
non-lethal power”, “unarmed violence”, “non-violent
violence”, “children of the stones” (all terms used by
Palestinian media and leadership) did not maximize the effect
of a nonviolent struggle. Stone throwing by children mostly
against soldiers and settlers was perceived as young adults
endangering Israeli civilians by throwing rocks. While the
Palestinian message may have been intimidation and
defiance, the Israelis sensed a live threatening situation.
Sporadic cases of petrol bombs/cocktail Molotovs (Israeli bus
in Jericho) resulting in occasional deaths also affected in 1989
the electoral behavior tilting the balance to a slight majority in
favor in of Likud. The element of fear is personal and subjective
and while Israelis could be causing enormous damage and
suffering to the Palestinians, it still did not compensate for the
sense of insecurity, which may have been accentuated by
previous historical experiences, including the recent trauma of
the Holocaust. All in all, the presence of a “limited violence”
did not allow to fully capitalize profit, and escalated into a loss
of unity and hundreds of lives by the Palestinian themselves
(what was called “Intra-fada”).
In the first Intifada we find a major shift and a significant
willingness to compromise in the final objectives (moving away
from the "liberation of Palestine", a "secular-democratic
Palestine" to acceptance of Israel through "the two-state
solution"). But when it comes to the means of achieving such
realistic and pragmatic objective, the shift is not all the way
from violent to nonviolent action. The concept "limited
violence" remained in Israeli perceptions as closer to
"violence" than “non-violence". Yet, in retrospect, we still could
find within the Israeli society a growing understanding of the
Palestinians as fighting for a right cause, Palestinians no longer
fearing the Israelis, determined to seek self-determination in
their own state (side-by-side with Israel), and potential partners
for a lasting peace.
What would have been the impact of a Palestinian leadership
and people’s nonviolent struggle? Evidence of its
effectiveness has been clear in other cases such as Gandhi’s
India, the Solidarity workers’ movement in Poland, the “Velvet”
revolution in Czechoslovakia, etc. While hard to predict at
that time, if the described context and “limited violence”
produced such positive outcomes, our expectation was that a
long-term nonviolent struggle had the potential of an Israeli
agreement to end occupation and the establishment of a
Palestinian state in better terms that the Oslo processes.
b) Public opinion
Sporadic polls of Israeli public opinion have focus on the issue
of Palestinian nonviolence/violent struggle. A poll conducted
by Edy and the Luis Guttman Israel institute of applied Social
Research – in December 1990 showed that:
62% perceived Palestinian violence as unlimited
74%-78% categorized throwing stones at civilians and/or
soldiers as unlimited violence.
The most frequent recommendation made to the Palestinians
(43%) was not to use any extent of force in order to achieve
the wanted results.
An absolute majority (80%) believed that the methods
employed by the Palestinians in order to establish a state are
mainly violent methods.
Half of those questioned (51%) agreed that the Palestinians
would probably or certainly not achieve a state without the
use of force.
These results show that while the level of violence used by
Palestinians was limited, it was not perceived as such by Israelis.
c) Media
During the first Intifada Edy's research followed Media
coverage of the Intifada in two major Israeli news papers
"Yediot Ahronot" and "Haaretz". Reports of violence and
nonviolence acts were monitored over 1988-1990.
Before turning to the results a general remark on media is in
order. The media is generally known to report more saliently on
the exceptional rather than the normal. It may therefore not be
surprising that the violent aspect of the Intifada was reflected
and stressed more, at least in the beginning.
The main findings were as follows: Percentages of non violence
actions reported in Yediot Ahronot went down from 50.6%
(1988) to 34.9% (1989) and 32.2% (1990). In Ha'aretz the reports
went down from 48% (1988) to 34.9% (1989) and 30.7% (1990).
The report on violent activities went up in "Haaretz" and down
in "Yediot Ahronot", possibly reflecting the routinization of
events wide circulating news. The results clearly show that the
majority of events reported were violent events 60.1% verses
39.9% non violent (the subdivision and counting of violent and
non violent events took into account different perceptions of
what is and isn't violent by categorizing according to actual
violence performed ie. Demonstration with violence =violent,
demonstration = non violent).
B. The Impact of the second Intifada on Israeli Society
a) Public Opinion Polls
In depth research on the topic of Israeli public opinion on non
violence actions, during the second Intifada, has yet to be
conducted. The only public opinion poll on Israelis reaction to
non violent actions by Palestinians was performed by "search
for common grounds" in August 2002. The data presented is
therefore based on public opinion polls dealing with related
topics, such as: a. attitudes towards Israeli non violent act
regarding the disengagement plan national security ex. This
report can only give a partial picture as to the attitudes in the
Israeli public. A more detailed report will be available once
the Truman institute conducts a poll on the topic towards the
end of 2005.
a. During 2002 Search for common grounds commissioned a
poll to determine attitudes of the Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli
publics on the potential for nonviolent methods in the
Palestinian Intifada. A Palestinian polling organization, the
Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC), carried
out the poll of 600 Palestinians through face-to-face
interviews. An Israeli polling organization, the B.L. and Lucille
Cohen Institute for Public Opinion Research of Tel Aviv
University, carried out the poll of 504 Israeli Jews by telephone
interviews. The key findings regarding Israeli public opinion are
as follows:
• 78% of Israelis questioned believe that the Palestinians
have a legitimate right to seek a Palestinian state provided
that they use non violent means.
• If the Palestinians were to move from violent to non
violent form of protest, A majority of Jew would favor making
concessions to the Palestinians, including fading out the
checkpoints between Palestinian towns (61%) and being more
flexible in negotiations about the future Palestinian state (60%).
With the disengagement plan holding a central place in Israeli
society discussions these days, a relevant question is the
change in attitudes towards the disengagement program
which could be promoted by non violent actions. This is
assuming that part of the negative attitudes stem from fear
from possible Palestinian violence following army retreat.
The wide spread support for the disengagement plan and these
results suggest that non violent action could promote the
advancement in negotiations.
b. The peace index is a public opinion poll conducted monthly
amongst Israeli public. Through a set questionnaire it tries to
determine the level of support towards peace. In addition to
the usual questions, the September poll dealt also with the
issue of disengagement and attitudes toward different
methods of protest which may be used by Israelis opposing to
the plan. Attitudes towards means of protest, conceived as
legitimate in the Israeli side, could reflect attitudes in general
including towards Palestinians legitimate ways of protest.
The questionnaire distinguished between three possible protest
methods:
Within the law (for example, petitions, legal demonstrations),
non violent civil disobedience (unlicensed demonstrations,
refusal of army service, refusal to pay taxes and so forth), finally
they were asked as to violent civil disobedience (the use of
force against evacuating settlements). The results of the poll
show that, as in the past, there is support for protest as long as
it is legal. 86.3% support legal means of protest while only 13.5%
support illegal methods, such as non violent civil disobedience,
and an even smaller number 6.5% support violent protest. In
another series of questions the initiators of the poll tried to find
the levels of support for negotiations and whether support was
conditional or not on the end of terror. 50.3% agreed with the
opinion that negotiations should not be renewed as long as
terror persists. 43.1% adopted the opinion that negotiations
should start without any prerequisites. Widespread non violent
activities replacing stereotypical perception of Palestinians as
terrorists could fulfill the preliminary demand of most of the
public and act as a catalyst for renewed negotiations.
c. Research on the reaction to terrorism may not seem
relevant at first glance, but as it is the other end of the scale
compared with non violent action, it could suggest why non
violent action has a high chance of promoting attitude
change in the Israeli public.
A recent research " The Impact of Terrorism on Political
Attitudes: A Two-Edged Sword" , based on 2000 questionnaires,
dealing with the impact of terrorism on Israelis political
attitudes concludes with the following:
Terrorist acts promote fear in Individuals and society in general.
Fearful individuals show the following behaviors:
• Impatience towards ‘others’, and the tendency to ignore
basic civil rights
• A decrease in the efficiency of cognitive processes >
irrational thinking and reliance on stereotypes
• Greater willingness to take risks
• Aggressive and militant reactions
These conclusions suggest that terrorism doesn't not help
change attitudes in the wanted direction (does not enhance
concession and so forth) but pushes individuals to the other
extreme. Although this research deals with the use of an
extreme form of violence and does not deal with non violent
action, it could suggest that affecting the psych of individuals
through non violent actions has a better chance of
succeeding since then individuals are not in the extreme state
of fear which promotes aggression and militant attitudes.
d. The National Security and Public Opinion Project monitors'
Israeli public opinion on issues related to national security.
Certain trends in attitudes of the Israeli public are relevant to
the topic.
The survey presented here "Israel Public opinion on national
security 2003"
was conducted between April 27 and May 23, 2003. Bellow are
the main relevant findings:
49% believe that the Israeli Arab conflict can not be solved by
military means.
34% thought it could and 17% took the middle position. The
parallel numbers for 2002 show a conceptual change that
occurred in the public over the later prior to the second
Intifada. The numbers respectively are 36% , 45% and 19%.
These results suggest that most people may be more attentive
to non violent actions made on both the Palestinian and the
Israeli side as they search for other forms, beside military force,
to bring the conflict to and end.
Important themes rising in the 2003 survey are those of
moderation and conciliation, replacing threats of violence
and appearing in the 2002 survey.
34% estimated the likelihood of war with Arab states as
medium or high compared with 79% in 2002 70% in 2001 39% in
2000.
Estimations of peace also rebounded: 43% thought that peace
with Arab states would be strengthened during the next three
years compared with 21% in 2002, 35% in 2001 and 70% in 2000.
The conclusion of this research is that there has been a change
in attitude in the last few years. Israeli public perceived the
aspirations of the Arabs in a less pessimistic manner than in
2002. This optimism may be an opening for strengthening the
trust of the Israelis in their Palestinian partners, a process which
non violent actions can promote.
Media coverage:
The topic of non violence is poorly reported on in Israeli media,
this may in itself point to lack of awareness in the Israeli public
to what is being done. Besides the major events bellow, there
were only a few reports on demonstrations against the wall. All
the reports on the demonstrations stated the presence of
foreign and Israelis at these demonstrations.
One of the most recent events gaining wide media coverage
in Israeli was the visit of Aron Gandi. Aron Gandi following in his
grandfathers' footsteps is a central figure in the field of non
violent resistance. Gandi was invited by Palestinians who want
to advance the idea of a popular struggle against Israelis. He
met with Palestinian authority chairman Yasser Arafat, met with
the Geneva convention initiators, lectured in the west bank
and other places. His visit was reported on national television
The connection of such a world known figure with the
Palestinian struggle surely raised awareness amongst Israelis to
other forms of action taken by Palestinians and by that may
contribute to enhancing trust toward some of the Palestinian
public.
Most major news papers in Israel (Maariv, Jerusalem Post,
Haaretz) reported the visit. However, a few reporters (mainly in
Haaretz) criticized the awareness of Israeli public to the topic
of non violence.
Quoting Yoel Esteron in Haaretz following Aron Gandis Visit:
There are Palestinians who now believe in Gandis ideas…..They
assembeled in El-Bireh on Thursday and participated in a the
Rally on Friday at Abu Dis Together with Israeli peace activists.
.. In the mean time their voice is not echoing here. The minute
they were given in the news broadcast was swallowed up by
reports of the near lynch of truck drivers at Qalandiyah.
Esteron continues and says that non violent struggle could win
the Palestinian lost affection of the left and practical support
from the very broad Israeli center including a considerable
part of the Likud party.
There were two more non violent events which received wide
coverage: the killing of activist Rachel Corey in March 2003
while she was demonstrating in non violent ways against the
destruction of a house in Rafiach and Gil Naamati, an Israeli
citizen, being shot and seriously wounded by an Israeli soldier.
These two widely reviewed events (in Israel and in the case of
Corey world wide), have two factors in common: (a) they were
both cases of non Palestinians performing non violent acts of
resistance (b) they were both cases in which the Israeli army
retaliated with severe force to the non violent act.
The wide coverage of these two events, while non violent acts
are being performed every day by Palestinians, raises the
question of the necessity for "outsiders" (non Palestinian)
support in order to raise awareness in Israeli public. The second
question is how Palestinians can gain more coverage for the
everyday non violent resistance acts performed by them.
As in the first Intifada, there is more exposure through the
media to violent events rather than non violent acts.
Final remarks & conclusions
Even if we did not study systematically as yet the impact of the
Post-Oslo Intifada Al Aqsa we can observe much more difficult
context that is determining a much more negative Israeli
attitude, based on the perception of a militarized Palestinian
struggle. We want to study the current picture in a systematic
manner and hopefully report back to you and to other
interested Palestinian friends in about a year from now. As we
have done in the short analysis above, we are not planning to
describe the cause and effect sequence and the major
responsibility of the Israelis in the current warlike situation.
Before reaching some conclusions allow us to give you some
realistic appraisal about the context in which the majority of
Israeli perception is being shaped:
a) The failure of Camp David II is showing that there was
that the Palestinians were not a reliable partner for
negotiation, then and even now corruption affecting
credibility of bona fide negotiators.
b) High level and prolonged Palestinian violence as
symbolized by suicide bombers, worse than previous historical
experiences since the 1948 war, including the isolated acts of
terror in the 1970’s and early 1980’s.
c) Most acts of violence have taken place within the pre-
1967 borders (and not against settlements and IDF forces in
the Occupied Territories). The shelling with “Kassam” rockets
may have replaced to a large extent the acts of suicide
bombers, now allegedly reduced because of the Wall (called
by most Israelis the “fence”). Hence, Intifada al Aqsa is different
from the first Intifada that focused on liberating the territories
of West Bank and Gaza not the liberation of all historic
Palestine (including Israel)
d) Most acts of violence against innocent civilians and not
military personnel (before the current Intifada more than 90%
of Israeli casualties were military).
e) The PLO Tunis leadership and Chairman Arafat in
particular are seen as supporting or at least condoning martyr’s
(Shay’id) violent acts.
f) The Palestinians do not believe in nonviolence
g) No peace with Palestinians and regional instability for
more than “100”years (quote). The popular view is that
separation is the “only way”.
As you can see, the overall context for Israeli attitudes is very
negative and does not take into account the Palestinian
suffering and the mistakes of the Israeli leadership.
As some people say: “The right was right”, “no left is left” !!!. And
yet, we are witnessing the disintegration of Likud, the Jewish
settlers are at the defensive facing majority support to
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Are we facing a recovery of
the moderates? Can Palestinians contribute to such process of
change?
The findings in public opinion polls and media show that there is
room for some optimism.
The following are our main conclusions and suggestions:
a) Public opinion polls show that the Israeli public in general is
ready to end the violence and is tending towards conciliation.
Non violent actions reported to the Israeli public, we believe,
will strengthen these positive trends in Israeli society and may
promote further support and activism.
b) The small number of reports on non violent actions and the
wide coverage of figures and activities conducted by non
Palestinian may point to the necessity of connecting with
Israeli and other figures. In his lecture on the subject of non
violence Johan Galtung repeated the importance of the
chain, or connection both within all strata's of the resisting
society and the connection to people in the other society. He
mentioned the chain factor as a main contributor to the
success of Gandhi’s struggle to free India of the British. This
connection between societies and within the Palestinian
society may need strengthening.
c) The low coverage of non violence events in Israeli media
may also suggest that Israeli publics' reaction have been
blunted and an extra ordinary, wide spanning breakthrough
activity is necessary to gain attention (for example the settlers
idea to create a human chain to Jerusalem).
d) Research conducted regarding the first Intifada and the
more recent studies presented here suggest the importance of
clear goal to be presented to Israelis while conducting
nonviolent acts. The interpretation given to acts may not
always be what they were intended to be and therefore could
be perceived as severe violence aimed at destructing the
state of Israel or endangering Israeli's rather than a legitimate
action against occupation.
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